Supply chain · npm · High

Critical Malicious npm Package 'polymarket-risk-manager' Compromises Systems

Threat Engine Auto-Feed · data current as of 2026-07-29

A critical malicious package, 'polymarket-risk-manager', has been identified in the npm ecosystem. Installation of this package leads to full system compromise, necessitating immediate secret rotation and thorough remediation efforts due to potential persistent access.

  • Package: npm / polymarket-risk-manager
  • Affected versions: >= 0
  • Severity: critical
  • Reach: ~68/wk
  • Exposure: 60/100 (High)

What happened — Credential / secret theft

The npm package 'polymarket-risk-manager' contains malware that, upon installation, fully compromises the host system. This grants an attacker complete control over the affected machine.

How the attack works

This is a malicious package attack where an attacker publishes a seemingly legitimate software component containing hidden malicious code. When developers or automated systems integrate this package into their projects, the malicious code executes, typically during installation or runtime, to achieve its objectives, in this case, full system compromise and credential theft.

Who's exposed

Profiles most at risk

  • Development teams using npm
  • Organizations with CI/CD pipelines that pull npm dependencies
  • Any user or system that has installed 'polymarket-risk-manager'

Conditions that increase exposure

  • Projects with unpinned dependencies that might inadvertently pull the malicious package
  • Lack of lockfiles (e.g., package-lock.json) to ensure consistent dependency versions
  • Use of internal mirrors or caches that may have ingested the malicious package
  • Automated build systems configured to install new or updated dependencies without strict vetting

Blast-radius scenarios

  • An attacker gains full control over the compromised system, potentially leading to data exfiltration, further network penetration, or deployment of additional malware.
  • All secrets and keys stored on the compromised computer are exposed and can be stolen, leading to broader credential compromise across an organization.
  • The blast radius extends to any systems or services accessible from the compromised machine, as the attacker can leverage their control for lateral movement.

What to do (defensive)

Detect

  • Review npm dependency trees for 'polymarket-risk-manager' across all projects.
  • Scan systems for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with full system compromise, though specific IOCs are not detailed in the advisory.
  • Monitor network traffic for unusual outbound connections from systems that might have installed the package.

Contain

  • Immediately isolate any system found to have 'polymarket-risk-manager' installed from the network.
  • Block 'polymarket-risk-manager' from being downloaded or installed by package managers or CI/CD pipelines.
  • Implement strict dependency pinning and lockfile usage to prevent accidental re-introduction.

Remediate

  • Consider any system that installed 'polymarket-risk-manager' as fully compromised and rebuild it from a trusted image.
  • Rotate all secrets and keys (e.g., API keys, SSH keys, access tokens, passwords) that were stored on or accessible from the compromised computer, performing this action from a different, trusted machine.
  • Thoroughly audit all accounts and systems for unauthorized access or changes post-compromise.

Frontier verdict — High

This is a critical supply-chain compromise requiring immediate isolation, secret rotation, and system rebuild due to full system control by an attacker.

Sources

For detection-engineering and awareness only · point-in-time · not security advice · sourced from the GitHub Advisory Database.